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Abstract 
Risk analysis techniques received increasing attention in the health care sector in the last 30 years. These techniques are diffused 
for health care processes, and less for devices. In fact, risk management for medical devices was introduced only recently (ISO 
14971 in 2000 and GHTF/SG3/N15R8 in 2005) [1,2]. The goal of this study is twofold. First, we aim at evaluating the state of 
the art of the diffusion of standards for the risk assessment of medical devices (with a focus on FMECA). Second, we evaluate 
the impact of risk assessment techniques on the practice. To pursue the first goal, a literature review has been performed through 
the investigation of medical and non-medical databases. To reach the second objective, we selected a leading Company in the 
development of medical devices and we investigated the process enacted to evaluate the risk connected to the design of new 
devices. The literature search confirmed the widespread application of the FMECA, the scant number of contributions about its 
applications on medical devices, and the main limitations related to the use of this technique. The empirical investigation showed 
that the Company spends a surprising amount of time and resources to set and deploy the FMEA rigorously, and it follows the 
passages envisioned by the literature carefully, with the unique intent to respect the standards. A gap emerges among the 
practitioners and academic words, with two possible explanations. First, the academics are not addressing the managerial and 
practical implications of their contributions; in so doing they deepen the “theory versus practice” chasm. Second, the presence of 
standards actually discourages the practitioners to push over and find new solutions. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last 10 years, several techniques applied to industrial risk management1 have been adapted to clinical 
contexts. These techniques have been extensively applied in healthcare settings to answer to an intrinsic need for 
higher control of adverse events, but over and above to respond to the pressures of external agents (i.e. legislations 
and standards). In fact, periodical risk analysis is required both by the U.S. Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organisation (JCAHO), and by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) normative [1]. 
As for the specific technique to be applied, the standards do not require the exclusive use of Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (i.e. FMEA), although much of the terminology of FMEA is built on the intent of the standards. As 
a consequence, nowadays the FMEA is the most widespread technique in healthcare facilities and healthcare 
industry to identify risks related to specific processes [3]. Despite its unquestionable diffusion, the FMEA 
applications have disregarded the evaluation of risk connected to medical devices. Nevertheless, the urgency of 
extending risk assessment techniques to medical device is evident. On the one hand, a specific normative has been 
developed in this view (ISO 14971)[1]. On the other hand, unsafe design and manufacturing of medical devices can 
significantly affect the patients’ safety [4,5,6]. The goal of this paper is to assess the state of the art of the 
application of FMEA on risk assessment of medical device and to provide an example of its application. The results 
of this study might be relevant to clarify the state of the art of the FMEA applications on medical device, and to 
discuss the implications of its practical implementation.  
2. FMEA on medical device: State of the art 
As previously disclosed, the review addresses the application of a specific methodology, the FMEA, on medical 
device [3]. FMEA is an inductive, bottom-up technique to evaluate processes, by determining potential sources of 
failure and how these failures affect the performance of the process. The FMEA implementation steps are: (a) 
choosing a process to be studied; (b) assembling a multidisciplinary risk management team; (c) collecting and 
organizing information on the process studied; (d) conducting a hazard analysis; (e) developing and implementing 
actions and outcomes measures. The main measures to be computed are: Severity (S), i.e. the worst potential 
consequence of a failure, determined by the degree of injury, property damage, or system damage that could 
ultimately occur; Occurrence (O), i.e. the probability of occurrence of a failure mode; Detection (D), i.e. the 
possibility to inspect the potential causes of a failure mode. Usually, S, O and D are quantified in a scale ranging 
from 1 to 10, or 1 to 5. The risk management team according to its experience and process capability assigns the 
score. The application of FMEA is often the result of two sub-analyses, the first being the Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA), and the second, the Criticality Analysis (CA). This is the reason why FMEA is often extended 
to FMECA, to indicate that criticality analysis is performed too. For the sake of completeness, we take into account 
both the terminologies in the literature search.  
The aim of the literature search is to analyze the contributions about the application of FMEA/FMECA on the 
development of medical devices, and to highlight potential limitations or points of interest. Since the contributions 
about FMEA/FMECA fall at the intersection between the medical and broader industrial/scientific literatures, we 
explored both medical and non-medical databases were explored, namely Pubmed and Web of Science. We limited 
the search from 2000 (the date of the first version of the standard ISO 14971) and we used the following keywords: 
“FMECA”; “FMECA” AND device* in title/abstract; “FMECA” in title/abstract AND device* in full text; 
“FMECA” in full text AND device* in title/abstract; “FMECA” AND device* in full text; “failure mode and effects 
analysis” AND device*; Keywords for non-medical databases were: “failure mode and effects analysis” AND 
“medical device*” in topic. The analysis was performed in 3 steps: first, the results of the search in the two 
databases were matched to eliminate the duplicates; second, a screening process was enacted by the three authors 
separately, to identify relevant articles and commentaries. Divergences were discussed in the face-to-face meetings, 
to find convergence; third, the screening process was repeated to define the final list of papers. The results of this 
 
1Both retrospective (e.g. Root Cause Analysis, Ishikawa diagram analysis, TRIPOD beta analysis) and prospective analysis (e.g. Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis, Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis). 
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literature search included a total of 54 references; 35 articles were selected for first step review, while 25 papers 
were removed since they focused on healthcare processes and not on device. 10 references have been finally 
selected for full review.  
2.1. Results of the literature review: Risk analysis and management in medical devices 
Risk analysis techniques received increasing attention in health care sector in the last 15 years. This is due to the 
increased attention on safety of both users and patients [7,8] and to the development and diffusion of risk assessment 
standards [1,2]. The analysis of risk associated with the device can be accomplished in different ways [9]. Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA), and HAZOP technique are the most relevant, as 
described in ISO 14971 [1]. We focus our analysis on the FMEA, since it is the most widespread technique [3]. 
FMEA is applied inductively, to evaluate the components of a device and to determine the way in which each 
component could fail and how the failure would affect the performance of the component itself, and potentially the 
device as a complete unit. When applied on medical device, FMEA identifies and removes defects, enhancing 
safety, and increasing customer satisfaction. It can also be applied to the design of medical device in order to 
prevent errors, accidents and adverse reactions. Healthcare organisations may use FMEA to determine failure mode 
that could be obviated with technology software and hardware solutions and work with device vendors to achieve 
these changes [10]. The terminologies and concepts related to FMEA are maintained in its application on medical 
device (e.g. S, O, D; 1 to 10 or 1 to 5 scores). FMEA documents are prepared by device manufacturers during 
product development and are generally part of the overall document submission package to regulatory agencies (e.g. 
the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Centre for Devices and Radiological Health) and 
recommended as best practices by the Global Harmonization Task Force (GHTF) [2] and the International 
Organization for Standardization (PTC, 2012) [11]. The FMEA is also a communication medium between device 
developers and device users, medical experts and system developers [12], which make it a “living document” that 
changes with the device use, in an effort to provide the most accurate risk profile.  
Although contributions about FMEA/FMECA underline the usefulness of this method to evaluate risks in 
medical devices, some recent contributions identify some limitations [3,4], especially when it comes to the 
reliability and validity of the FMEA process and its output. Some authors highlight the mathematical limitations of 
FMEA output, the risk priority number (RPN), and the different modes of FMEA application in practice. In fact, 
there is considerable variation within the process steps, e.g. in team composition, frequency of meeting, duration, 
how the probabilities are quantified. The main fault of FMEA therefore deals with subjectivity, although the use of 
numerical scores gives an impression of mathematical impartiality. This research stream is confirmed by Liu et al. 
(2012) - who proposed an improved FMEA based on Mathematics and Grey Relational Analysis to better carry out 
use-related risk analysis for medical devices, by limiting the uncertainties related to experts’ subjective analysis [4] 
– and by Lin et al. (2014) – who developed a FMEA procedure, based on experts fuzzy linguistic evaluation of RPN 
[13].  
2.2. Concluding remarks 
According to the results of the literature review, we confirm that the FMEA technique is actually one of the most 
used for failure analysis in risk management in medical devices design. Nevertheless, two aspects deserve a 
comment. First, the scant number of contributions retrieved on this topic, shows that, despite the wide consensus 
about the need of improvement of FMEA techniques in healthcare, the academic interest in FMEA theory and 
applications to medical devices is still limited. Second, several limitations of the FMEA applications emerged from 
the contributions on healthcare device. In our view, the expedient proposed by the authors to overcome the 
methodological limitations in this field are unmanageable in the practice.  
Hence, how do practitioners deal with the FMEA limitations? We attempt to answer this question in the 
following section, by describing an application of the FMEA on the design of a medical device, according to the 
approach followed by a leading Company in the field of medical devices design and production.  
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3. FMECA in practice: Problem and case study 
In the last two decades, Diabetes, especially type 2, has increased its incidence in world population [14]. Chronic 
Critical Limb Ischemia (CLI) represents the major outcome of significant atherosclerotic diabetes-related disease of 
the lower-extremity vessels. This pathology is associated with a loss of quality of life (QoL), significant lifestyle-
limiting symptoms, potential major limb loss (amputation), and death. Patients with CLI require a multidisciplinary, 
multimodality approach targeting their atherosclerotic risk; however, less invasive approaches are often tardive and 
unsatisfactory and CLI sequelae of rest pain and claudication translate in tissue loss, representing an urgent to 
emergent care matter. These patients require immediate and aggressive modification of their risk factors and 
endoluminal or open intervention to restore circulation to the endangered limb. Endoluminal intervention consisting 
in Percutaneous Transluminal Angioplasty (PTA) is a key revascularization therapy in these patients since re-
establishing an adequate blood supply to the wound is essential for avoiding a major amputation [15]. PTA is an 
endovascular technique based on the use of balloon catheters: a device consisting of a shaft connected to an 
inflatable "balloon" is used during a catheterization procedure to enlarge an atherosclerotic plaque within the body. 
Peregrin et al. (2010) analysed the clinical success of PTA in diabetic patients with CLI taking into account the 
number of vessels successfully treated (increasing from 56% to, respectively, 73%, 80% and 83% with 0, 1, 2 or 3 
lower limb vessels open) [16]. The development and production process of PTA catheters requires a sophisticated 
approach in terms of design and manufacturing. Overall risk management is a major concern, since the implications 
of the poor performances of the device on the patients’ quality of life are apparent and appalling.  
Provided the relevance and implications of this kind of medical device, an angioplasty balloon catheter (hereafter 
called “PTA catheter”) has been selected as a case study to be investigated in the second part of this paper. More 
specifically, we looked at how a leading Company in the field of healthcare devices development (i.e. Medtronic 
Inc.) applied the FMEA technique in the design process of this device.  
3.1. Medical device functioning and description 
The PTA catheter acts dilating the plaque obstructing the artery, inflating a balloon via contrast media. The 
catheter consists of two plastic tubes: guide wire (gw) and shaft tube. Gw tube is inserted coaxially into the shaft for 
the whole catheter length, and exits from the shaft tube for additional few cm. In the distal part of the catheter, a 
balloon is bonded proximally to the distal end of the shaft, and distally to the distal end of the guidewire tube. In the 
proximal part of the catheter, a hub is connected to the proximal end of the shaft and of the gw tube, emerging from 
the shaft tube. Gw tube lumen allows the passage of guide wires (i.e. ancillary device to navigate the vasculature) to 
facilitate advancement of the catheter to and through the stenosis to be dilated. The gap between Gw tube and the 
shaft tube allow passage of contrast media solution to inflate the balloon when it is in the target anatomical site. 
3.2. PTA balloon catheter risk assessment 
The observation of how the Company applies FMECA confirms and strengthens the FMECA implementation 
steps already discussed in Section 2.1. The standard approach followed by the Company is as follows: (1) Choosing 
a process to be studied - the selected process in this case is the PTA angioplasty balloon design and construction. (2) 
Assembling a multi-disciplinary team; according to the procedure of Medtronic, the members of the team should 
necessarily belong to defined product development areas. At least an R&D engineer, a Quality Assurance (QA) 
engineer, a Process engineer, a Clinical Specialist, and a Regulatory (RA) Specialist must be involved in the 
analysis. Each member brings different expertise: R&D and Process engineers provides the information on product 
design and components and manufacturing processes; Clinical specialists expertise provide the knowledge of the 
clinical field and operating conditions of the device; QA expertise is functional to link product design to operating 
field; RA specialist is in charge of ensuring compliance with Standards and Regulations. (3) Collecting and 
organizing information on the process studied - Information collection and organization: recursive meetings are set, 
initially involving R&D, Process engineers and QA for product/processes analysis, then extending to Clinical and 
finally to RA to have a complete work review. (4) Conducting a hazard analysis - Hazard Analysis is performed 
under the leadership of QA and Clinical expertise, since knowledge of the clinical/operating field is necessary to 
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understand impact of product failure on patient. (5) Developing and implementing actions and outcomes measures - 
As a last stage, it is mandatory to address each risk with actions aimed at Design/Process controls – each control will 
have a detection rate of the related failure mode, whose value is chosen on the team judgment basis. 
At points (3) and (4), the team faces the key topics of: (a) potential failure modes and functional effects of the 
product having potential impact on the product safety; (b) potential hazards related to the product – also called 
clinical harms, that may affect the product user (patient undergoing PTA procedure). 
Once all relevant hazards and failure modes/functional effects are listed, risk estimation is conducted on the basis 
of team’s experience, knowledge and web/literature data, assigning Severity and Occurrence (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Risk analysis workflow drawn onto the considered company approach, from part to functional effects and clinical harms. 
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3.3. PTA balloon catheter: Potential failure modes and functional effects 
Considering the described PTA catheter design, the question is “which potential failure modes are related to this 
product?”. This depends on the device structure, materials, geometry and overall design and consists in the 
information that are usually collected during step (3) (information collection and organization) of the FMECA 
workflow. Possible failure modes identified for device components are: A. Inability to inflate / being pressurized 
(device part: balloon); B. Inability to maintain bonding to catheter shaft tube (device part: balloon); C. Inability to 
transmit fluid during injection (device part: guidewire tube); D. Inability to allow access for the Guidewire (device 
part: gw tube); E. Loss of connection/bond to the hub (device part: gw tube); F. Inability to transmit fluid from the 
Luer to the balloon (device part: shaft); G. Inability to bend and track in the vasculature (device part: shaft); H. 
Inability to transmit load from and to physician (device part: shaft); I. Inability to transmit inflation fluid to shaft 
(and then to balloon) (device part: hub); L. Inability to confine gw tube and shaft tube radially (device part: hub).  
Once failure modes are identified, the following question arises: which are the functional effects of the selected 
failure modes? There are different ways to answer this question in industry practice: (1) Medical Device 
manufacturers have complaints data base, collecting complaints coming from the clinical field: these usually 
provide a wide range of possible failure modes related to previous marketed and similar products. Thus, that is used 
as a basis for collecting and populating the list of failure modes during risk analysis in product development. (2) 
Regulatory agencies (e.g. FDA with MAUDE – Manufacturers and Users Facility Device Experience) [17] collect 
and report suspected device-associated deaths, serious injuries and malfunctions in the MAUDE, monitoring device 
performance, detecting potential device-related safety issues, and contributing to benefit-risk assessments of 
products. Accordingly, these regulatory agencies sources are often used as a basis for initial risk analysis. (3) 
Guidance, Standards are intended as reference and aid for manufacturers to identify possible failure modes 
according to different devices class/type. (4) Engineering and clinical experience is an additional tool always 
involved in the potential failure modes determining.  
The team has investigated all the potential failure modes related to PTA catheters starting from device potential 
issues. Data for this analysis came from each of the above-mentioned sources: medical device company complaints 
data base was considered; MAUDE website was referenced; FDA guidance was followed (i.e. “Class II Special 
Controls Guidance Document for Certain Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA) Catheters”, 
issued on September 8, 2010 and ISO 10555-1: 2013(E) -Intravascular catheters – sterile and single-use catheters; 
Team members engineering and clinics background). 
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3.4. PTA balloon catheter: Clinical harms 
Clinical harms section is usually completed according to the same sources listed above, especially complaints 
data base, MAUDE data and Engineering/Clinical experience. In this phase of the risk analysis, the team member 
from Clinical Department is usually responsible for collecting these data. Literature is definitely an additional 
valuable source for this research. The working team has approached the research of clinical harms starting from the 
MAUDE and company’s complaints data base (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Clinical harms and related severity, assigned on a basis of MAUDE analysis, team discussion and company historical data.  
Clinical Harm Severity Explanation 
Delayed Procedure 6 Time needed to accomplish the procedure is increased due to the device fail  
Vessel Rupture 8 Blood vessel wall rupture 
Secondary intervention 8 Need of a second device 
Embolism 7 Particle loss in the downstream blood districts 
Dissection 7 Tear within blood vessel wall 
Ischemia 8 Blood supply lack 
Blood Loss 7 Blood loss within the tissues or from the puncture location 
Vasospasm 6 Blood vessel spasm leading to vasoconstriction 
Amputation 9 Limb/body extremity removal 
Death 10  
3.5. PTA balloon catheter: Overall FMECA 
Finally, working team has organized the collected info in a table that connects failure modes, functional effects 
and clinical harms. An occurrence (1-10) has been assigned to each functional effect and related clinical harm.  
Occurrence of each functional effect and clinical harms has been established according to the same principles 
followed by company working team. Occurrence Ranks are assigned starting from the complaint and sales analysis, 
by considering: the number of sales in a significant time-frame (e.g. last three years) of a device similar to the one 
selected (i.e. PTA catheter) in a significant geography (e.g. US market); the number of complaints related to a 
selected failure mode is considered; the ratio of number of complaints due to a selected failure mode over the 
number of sales is calculated and then normalized on a 1-10 scale; the same occurrence calculation is performed for 
clinical harms; Team members – based on product knowledge, literature data and engineering judgment – discuss 
the given ratings, (if needed) increasing or decreasing the ranks with proper rationales. A set of possible detection 
methods has been provided (according to point (5) in section in 3.3). In particular, the design choice consists in a 
combination of dimensions/material choice able to guarantee that the product addresses the potential failure mode; 
the test represents the method used to verify that designed product is able to meet design specifications, thus 
ensuring product safety. It is worth deepening this last step, being the key one in the FMECA workflow: assigning 
occurrence, and previously severities, is indeed a delicate issue. We have seen that the different stages of FMECA 
are led by project team members, often supported by experts belonging to the departments responsible for the risk 
analysis. This is the typical approach that, as we have seen, characterizes practitioners. The authors of the present 
paper applied the same approach in the risk analysis performed: inspired by the medical company approach, each 
step of the analysis was debated and discussed – since the authors had different knowledge degree of the topic, this 
was ultimately useful to facilitate the debate. From this exercise, the authors have noticed that, when discussing 
severities, occurrences and potential failure modes, the debate strongly depended on team members’ perspective: 
there is room of discussion around each topic, even if ratings (e.g. occurrence) and values (e.g. severity) rise from 
robust assumptions (e.g. review of similar products, database, etc…).  
Thus, the potential limitations that occur when a project team performs risk analysis within an industry have been 
experienced: even if the overall FMECA structure is well defined and strictly constrained by overall Company 
49 Rossella Onofrio et al. /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  43 – 50 
Quality systems, subjectivity of ratings has still a meaningful role in the analysis. Experience and team members 
knowledge represent the most important drivers; moreover, teams usually leverage on database and similar product 
analysis as useful tools to limit subjectivity, however without reducing it at all. Responsibility of each team member 
is aimed at providing the best risk classification, severity and occurrence allocation: moreover, technical rationales 
are always at the base of key choices that ultimately represent the mostly shared opinions. 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
This study takes roots from the consideration that, despite its unquestionable diffusion, the FMEA contributions 
in healthcare tend to polarize over the evaluation of the risk connected to medical processes, neglecting the urgency 
of extending risk assessment techniques to medical devices.  
Coherently, the goal of this essay was twofold. On the one hand, we evaluated the state of the art of the 
application of FMEA on the assessment of the risk connected to medical devices. The literature search confirmed 
the widespread application of the FMEA, the scant number of contributions about its applications on medical 
devices, and the main limitations related to the use of this technique in this field. Second, once collected the 
potential solutions proposed in the industrial field to overcome the FMEA limitations, we looked within the 
practitioners’ worlds, to see how they deal with this methodology and its faults in the practice. To do so, we selected 
a leading Company in the development of medical devices (Medtronic Inc.) and we investigated the process enacted 
to evaluate the risk connected to the desing of new devices. 
The empirical investigation showed that the Company spends a surprising amount of time and resources to set 
and deploy the FMEA rigorously, and it follows the passages envisioned by the literature carefully. Despite the 
unquestionable usefulness and diffusion of the FMEA in the Company practice, some limitations emerge. In concert 
with the literature findings, the issues of reliability and subjectivity of scores came out pretty evidently. The 
Company tries to overcome these limitations through the use of historical data (e.g. complaint database) and of the 
multidisciplinary competencies of the team. While team members competencies, experience and knowledge of the 
field are ultimately subjective items, complaint database and online reports made by governative or recognized 
institutions (e.g FDA) represent a more objective source. Thus the effort of Company is constantly aimed at keeping 
the most documented and objective approach, trying to limit all the potential sources of subjectivity and newness in 
the workflow. This definitely affects the relation with the solutions envisioned by the academic words: even if 
potentially innovative or less time consuming, these are often not even considered. In fact, it seems more well-
advised to maintain a strengthened approach employed through the years, than to introduce changes that could make  
issues emerge from certification bodies and auditors.  
It is however worth to underline that, despite the FMECA is necessary for a project to be accomplished, the final 
document remains “alive” during the product lifecycle: indeed, product monitoring after launch and complaints 
analysis are constantly controlled by the quality members of the project. If needed, so, FMECA can be revised, well 
supported by rationales or justifications for each action that is taken in this perspective. Thus, the possibility to 
maintain the document monitored and, eventually, to revise it on a rationale basis might be preferable than a change 
in the document form or, more drastically, in the risk analysis approach. 
To conclude, an evident gap is therefore retrieved among the practitioners and academic words. This 
consideration brings with it two possible explanations. First, the academics are not addressing the managerial and 
pratical implications of their contributions; in so doing, they deepen the theory versus practice chasm. Second, the 
presence of standards actually disincentivizes the practitioners to push over and find new solutions: in fact, the 
quality of the process of risk assessement applied by Medtronic is coherent with the requests of the ISO 14971 and 
there is no reason why the Company should modify a well-rooted process. This study is useful to shed light on a still 
under-debated phenomenon. Nevertheless, it has several limitations. Above all, more generalizable conclusions 
might be taken by applying the research on other leading Companies in the Industry of healthcare device 
development. Moreover, the attempt to bridge the academic and practitioners’ worlds by developing a more 
manageable technique to overcome the FMEA limitations, might represent a ambituous though needed contribution. 
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